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REGULATION FD: THE YEAR THAT PASSED AND
THE YEARS AHEAD
"[IJnvestors commit capital because they have a basic
confidence in the quality and integrity of America's
markets. That faith does more than fuel markets-it makes
markets possible. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
This statement by Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), emphasizes the
absolute necessity of investor confidence to the viability of financial
markets in the United States. In no uncertain terms, Levitt suggests
that in the absence of such confidence, true markets simply could not
exist. It is hardly surprising, then, that during Levitt's tenure at the
helm of the SEC, the agency seemed determined to take all steps
necessary to prevent such a scenario from ever unfolding. More
specifically, the SEC endeavored to sufficiently neutralize any
threats that could ultimately lead to the common investor's loss of
faith in American markets.2 In an effort to eliminate perhaps the
most significant of these threats, the SEC adopted Regulation FD
3
(Fair Disclosure) on October 23, 2000. It was an extremely
controversial move that was decried by many, but applauded by
many more.
Regulation FD is a measure designed by the SEC to eliminate
selective disclosure,4 a time-honored practice among the elite of the
1. Arthur Levitt, Speech by SEC Chairman: Renewing the Covenant with
Investors (May 10, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/speecb/spch370.htm.
2. See Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-7881 (Oct. 23, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
788 1.htm [hereinafter Final Rule].
3. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2001).
4. The term "selective disclosure" refers to the disclosure of material
nonpublic information by a corporate insider to an analyst, information the
analyst could presumably trade upon for personal profit or the profit of others.
This is distinguishable from ordinary insider trading, which refers to trading on
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investment community, but one that many regard as the most
potentially destructive threat to investor confidence. Prior to
Regulation FD, corporate insiders were legally permitted to disclose
material information to a select grout of analysts while keeping
shareholders and the public in the dark. During this time,
CEOs, analysts, brokers, and money managers could shape
the market to their advantage. They went to invitation-only
conferences or took closed conference calls and heard
exclusive financial details of what was coming up. It's no
accident that stock prices often soared [or plummeted] after
such meetings, leaving small investors wondering what they
had missed.7
When the SEC finally put an end to this distinctly unfair
disadvantage and leveled the playing field for the common investor,
an intense public debate erupted that seemed to take on a life of its
own.
While individual investors expected Regulation FD to benefit
the markets by setting them on an even keel with even the most
powerful members of the investment community, the business elite
who stood to lose from the SEC's latest measure aroused fears in
some by predicting, among other things, a sharp decrease in the
quality and quantity of information and a dramatic increase in market
volatility.9 This debate, however, was entirely forward-looking in
nature and the predictions of both sides were untested because the
the basis of material nonpublic information by a company's own officers and
directors in the absence of disclosure to the SEC. Investors can also engage in
illegal insider trading by buying or selling securities based on material
nonpublic information they receive from a corporate insider. See Clay
Richards, Comment, Selective Disclosure: "A Fencing Match Conducted on a
Tightrope" and Regulation FD-The SEC's Latest Attempt to "Electrify the
Tightrope," 70 MISS. L.J. 417, 418-20 (2000).
5. See John Labate, Keeping Lines Open on Wall Street, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 23, 2001, at 8.
6. See id.
7. Don't Roll Back Fair Disclosure, BUS. WK., Aug. 13, 2001, at 124.
8. See Final Rule, supra note 2, at 3.
9. See John Labate & Andrew Hill, America's Open Season, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 22, 2000, at 22; Brian O'Keefe, Is Reg FD Wrecking Your
Porfolio?, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2001, at 392; Pondel/Wilkinson Group,
Regulation FD Survey Reveals Strong Disdain by Analysts, Porfolio
Managers, NEWS RELEASE (Los Angeles), Dec. 28, 2000, at
http://www.pondel.com/pages/regfdsurvey.html.
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market had never been free from selective disclosure practices until
the adoption of Regulation FD. Only now, more than one full year
since the passage of the statute, is preliminary empirical data
available, and this data suggests that the grim prophecies of the
critics lacked merit.10 Regulation FD has instilled confidence in the
common investor by creating equality in American markets, and it
has done so without the negative fallout that several had anticipated.
The problem is, however, that there is a possibility that, despite
its early success, Regulation FD could become the first casualty of
the recent change in leadership at the SEC." Arthur Levitt resigned
on February 9, 2001, with two years remaining in his term,12 and his
replacement as chairman, Harvey Pitt, has been welcomed with open
arms by business elites because they expect his confirmation to
"guarantee the reexamination of Regulation FD-a milestone of
Levitt's tenure-which Pitt has openly criticized."'13  If such a
reexamination actually does take place, and if the repeal or the
scaling back of Regulation FD results from it, the common investor
will have suffered an incredibly disheartening setback in the battle
for parity. Confidence in the markets, deemed absolutely crucial by
Levitt, could be irreparably harmed, or perhaps even lost.
The remainder of this discourse is divided into four parts. Part
II provides a backdrop to the discussion by examining the situation
that existed before Regulation FD, the SEC's motivations for
adopting it, and the rule itself. Part III assesses the impact of
Regulation FD on American markets during the past year and
contends that investor confidence seems to have been enhanced
without incurring the costs that some had predicted. Part IV analyzes
the effect that Regulation FD has had on financial analysts and
asserts that those who rely on skill-and not access to insiders-will
10. See Fred Barbash, The Earthquake That Didn't Happen, WASH. POST,
Apr. 22, 2001, at HI; Lori Chordas, Regulation FD Does Not Harm Markets,
Says USC Report, REG. FD NEWS, July 23, 2001, at http://www.ccbn.com/
regulationfd/20010723.html.
11. See Ken Hoover, Will Regulation FD Be in SECs Cross Hairs?,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, May 10, 2001, at B1; Lauren Rudd, Time Is Running
Out for Fair-Disclosure Rule, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 2,2001, at C6.
12. See Marcia Stepanek, Arthur Levitt: Gone but Not Out, IR ZONE, at
http://www.irzone.com/shv/shv_070801_1.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2001).
13. JH, Public Companies See Pitt As a Welcome Change After Levitt, SEC.
WK., June 25, 2001, at 7.
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survive the inevitable shakeout that is looming. Finally, Part V
concludes by addressing the changing of the guard at the SEC and
the danger that it may pose to Regulation FD. It argues that
Regulation FD is a statute that was designed more to modify
business practices than to punish them; a statute that must be given a
fair chance to reshape the behavior of the investment community
before it is prematurely scaled back or repealed by the new
leadership at the SEC. While it is still unclear how the SEC will
handle Regulation FD during Pitt's tenure, the value of the
controversial law to the common investor is both evident and
substantial.
In the end, this Comment aims to relate that it is imperative for
Regulation FD to emerge unscathed from the shifting winds at the
SEC. The confidence of the common investor is inexorably linked to
the integrity of American capital markets and should not be
sacrificed merely to appease the more powerful interests that exist in
the investment community. Regulation FD has finally brought
equality and fairness to the markets. The common investor-and
perhaps even the markets themselves-simply cannot afford to lose
it now.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The State ofAffairs Prior to Regulation FD
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193414 clearly sets
out that trading on the basis of material nonpublic information is
prohibited.15 Although the regulation appears rather straightforward,
the courts have been reluctant to interpret it strictly.' 6 Instead, they
have been sympathetic to the problems that face corporate executives
and analysts in their communications with each other. These
discussions were once even characterized as "a fencing match
conducted on a tightrope," in which the executive "is compelled to
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
15. See id. § 240.10b5-1.
16. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (finding that there must be
some sort of manipulation or deception in addition to a breach of fiduciary
duty); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding
that a duty to disclose only arises when it is certain that the information will
substantially affect the market price).
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parry often -incisive questioning while teetering on the fine line
between data properly conveyed and material inside information that
may not be revealed without simultaneously disclosing it to the
public."' 7 In recognition of the deceptive pitfalls of insider trading
law, the United States Supreme Court has attempted to shield
executives and analysts from liability with a series of decisions, most
notably its ruling in the seminal case of Dirks v. SEC.'8
In Dirks, an analyst received information from a corporate
insider who claimed that the assets of his former firm were vastly
overstated as a result of fraudulent corporate practices.' 9 The analyst
proceeded to disclose this information to both clients and investors,
some of whom later relied on it in liquidating their positions in the
corporation.20 Much to the dismay of the SEC, the Supreme Court
used this case to reject the argument that a person is subject to
liability simply by virtue of trading while in the possession of
material nonpublic information provided by an insider.
2 1
The Court instead established a new standard, one that imposes
liability on the recipient of insider information only when: 1) the
insider breaches a fiduciary duty to the corporation by disclosing the
information; 2) the insider derives a personal benefit, either directly
or indirectly, from making the disclosure; and, 3) the tippee then
trades on the information while the tippee knew or should have
known that the insider had breached.22 The Court's tough new test
has been widely recognized as both insulating executives and
analysts from insider trading liability and permitting selective
disclosure, especially since the "personal benefit" requirement of the
second prong often has been interpreted as a financial benefit,
something insiders rarely derive when selectively disclosing
information. 3 In Dirks, therefore, the SEC paid a high price because
17. Bausch & Lomb, 565 F.2d at 9.
18. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
19. See id. at 649. The insider actually urged the analyst to verify the fraud
and disclose it publicly. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 667.
22. See id. at 654-67.
23. See Richards, supra note 4, at 425; Anthony T. Horgan, Comment,
Regulation FD Provides Firm Footing on Selective Disclosure High Wire, 46
ViiL. L. REv. 645, 651 (2001).
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it lost not only an important case, but also its ability to effectively
prevent selective disclosure practices.
B. The SEC's Motivations for Adopting Regulation FD
Nearly two decades after the Supreme Court handed down its
unfavorable ruling in Dirks, the SEC boldly adopted Regulation FD
because the situation simply had gotten out of control. According to
a study conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIR)
in 1998, over one-quarter of the responding companies admitted to
engaging "in some type of selective disclosure practices." 24 This
figure, as shockingly high as it was, naturally did not even include
those companies that engaged in selective disclosure practices but
refused to admit it. As the SEC has noted, it is "difficult to quantify
precisely the amount of selective disclosure-just as it is difficult to
quantify precisely the amount of ordinary insider trading. Incidents
of selective disclosure, like insider trading, by definition are not
conducted openly and in public view."25 Hence, since the percentage
of companies that voluntarily admitted to the practice was
substantial, there was serious cause for concern that companies
secretly engaged in the practice of selective disclosure would lift the
percentage to frightening levels.
Such a possibility seemed even more likely when, upon
releasing the proposal for Regulation FD, the SEC received nearly
6,000 comment letters, the vast majority of which were from
individual investors who almost uniformly urged the adoption of the
measure. 26  The letters "expressed frustration with... selective
disclosure" and several "cited personal experiences in which they
believed they had been disadvantaged by the practice"; in fact, many
"expressed surprise that existing law did not already prohibit this
practice."27  These disturbing accounts were accompanied by
numerous troublesome media reports that the SEC could not help but
24. J. David Washburn, Esq., SEC Approves New Regulation FD, CLIENT
ALERT (Arter & Hadden, LLP) Sept. 2000, http://www.arterhadden.com/
publications/clientalertlalert09l300.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2002). The study
found that more than twenty-five percent of responding companies admitted to
the practice.
25. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 4.
26. Seeid. at3.
27. Id.
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notice.28 These reports alleged that several public corporations had
engaged in selective disclosure practices to the detriment of the
market and investors-even after Regulation FD had been
proposed.29 Selective disclosure practices thus posed clear threats to
investor confidence that were very real, incredibly harmful, and in
need of an immediate solution.
That solution was provided by the SEC in the form of
Regulation FD, which the agency claimed to have adopted for two
compelling reasons. First, as previously mentioned, the SEC and
then-Chairman Arthur Levitt strongly believed that selective
disclosure practices ultimately led to a "loss of investor confidence in
the integrity of American capital markets., 30 The agency asserted
that "[i]nvestors who see a security's price change dramatically and
only later are given access to the information responsible for that
move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with
market insiders." 31  In truth, there appears to be little practical
difference between selective disclosure and ordinary insider trading
in terms of the bottom line for the common investor. In both cases, a
relatively small number of individuals with superior access to
information profit from their connections, rather than from their skill
or effort,32 and in both cases the individual investor is left either
holding on to a stock that sinks or missing out on a stock that soars.
3 3
The SEC perceived this disparity as an unacceptable reality that
threatened to erode the sense of fairness needed by markets in order
to function properly and to thrive.
3 4
Second, the SEC was deeply concerned that selective disclosure
practices, if permitted to continue, would keep in place a corrupt
market environment in which corporate insiders would strategically
circulate material information to only those analysts who would paint
a flattering picture of the corporation's financial health. 5 The SEC
noted that "in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure,
28. See id. at 4. The SEC provided a list of over twenty media reports that
it found particularly distressing. See id. at 4 n. 11.
29. See id. at5.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. See id. at3.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or
otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to
selectively disclosed information." 36  This conclusion was hardly
lacking support, as the SEC had received reports stating that, in some
instances, analysts who had published negative comments about a
corporation had been excluded by that corporation from calls and
meetings to which other analysts had been granted access.37 The
possibility, then, that corporate management may have been using
material information "as a commodity... to gain or maintain favor
with particular analysts ' 38 presented a serious problem that the SEC
needed to address.
In essence, selective disclosure practices provided corporations
with the power to control the flow of material information, the power
to suppress the truth whenever the need arose. As far as the SEC
was concerned, such a power posed a substantial threat to investor
confidence and the integrity of the markets. 39 The Supreme Court
disagreed, however, and with its decision in Dirks, the inappropriate
exchange of material information between executives and analysts
became a legally acceptable practice, even though it put the common
investor at a severe disadvantage and it engendered a rather palpable
sense of injustice in American markets. Rendered powerless to
combat selective disclosure practices with the existing insider trading
laws, and faced with an increasingly unequal investing environment,
the SEC adopted Regulation FD, which Levitt has called "probably
the single most important rule the SEC has embraced in its 65-year
history.
' 4 °
C. Regulation FD
Regulation FD is regarded by many as an essential development
in the field of securities regulation because it finally protects
individual investors and the markets from the harmful effects of
selective disclosure practices. This Comment will now turn to the
rule itself and briefly examine the specific provisions of Regulation
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 2-3.
40. Stepanek, supra note 12, http://www.irzone.com/shv/shv_070801_1.
html.
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FD.41 The basic rule that governs selective disclosure is set forth in
Rule 100 of Regulation FD. It provides that when an issuer, or
person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information
to certain enumerated persons-primarily "securities market
professionals" 42 or holders of the issuer's securities who may trade
on the basis of the information-it must make public disclosure of
that information.43 The rule states that the nature of the selective
disclosure will determine the timing of the public disclosure." If the
disclosure is intentional, the information must be simultaneously
disclosed to the public.45 If, however, the disclosure is non-
intentional, the information must be promptly4 6 disclosed to the
public.47 This, in its most basic form, is Regulation FD.48 At first
glance, the rule may appear rather unambiguous, but upon closer
examination, a few issues do require clarification.
41. As previously mentioned, this Comment intends to analyze the early
impact of Regulation FD and what the future holds for the controversial rule.
That being said, it shall address in detail only those provisions of Regulation
FD that are necessary to inform the reader and to further the purposes of this
discussion. For a more technical analysis of the specific provisions and
procedures of Regulation FD, see Final Rule, supra note 2, at 7-20; John P.
Jennings, Regulation FD: SEC Reestablishes Enforcement Capabilities Over
Selective Disclosure, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 543, 566-77 (2001); Richards, supra
note 4, at 428-35.
42. "[S]ecurities market professionals" are "(1) broker-dealers and their
associated persons, (2) investment advisors, certain institutional investment
managers and their associated persons, and (3) investment companies, hedge
funds, and affiliated persons." Final Rule, supra note 2, at 8 (providing a brief
restatement of those identified in 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i-iii) (2001)).
Exempt from this group are "temporary insiders" (like attorneys, investment
bankers, and accountants), persons who expressly agree to keep the disclosed
information in confidence, and credit-rating entities. See 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(2)(i-iii) (2001). Disclosures made in connection with most
securities offerings and disclosures to the media are also outside the scope of
Regulation FD. See id. § 243.100(b)(2)(iv); Final Rule, supra note 2, at 6.
43. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100.
44. See id. § 243.100(a)(1)-(2).
45. See id. § 243.100(a)(1).
46. "Promptly" means "as soon as reasonably practicable" but never after
twenty-four hours or the start of the next day's trading on the New York Stock
Exchange. Id. § 243.10 1(d).
47. See id. § 243.100(a)(2).
48. The statute containing the general rule regarding selective disclosure
has been provided in infra Appendix.
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First, Regulation FD is concerned only with "material"
nonpublic information; but rather than define the term, it "relies on
existing definitions.., established in the case law.",49 The common
law definitions referred to by the SEC are derived mainly from TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.5 ° In TSC Industries, the Court held
that information is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in arriving at an
investment decision, or if the information "would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available."5' Although the SEC
complemented these definitions with a list of certain types of
information that usually will be deemed material, 52 some critics
maintained that materiality was still too vague a standard for
practical purposes.53 They argued that while materiality offered the
courts guidance, executives would remain uncertain, and hence,
unwilling to disclose as much information for fear of liability. 54 The
SEC's stance on the issue of materiality-and the critics' claims that
it would have a chilling effect on corporate disclosure practices-is
that a more rigid standard would be inadequate because it would lack
the flexibility to fit the circumstances of each case.55 In the end,
Regulation FD was drafted to accord with this position.
49. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 10.
50. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
51. Id. at449.
52. See Final Rule, supra note 2, at 11. Some examples from the list
furnished by the SEC are: earnings information, mergers, acquisitions, new
products, changes in management, and bankruptcies. It is important to note
that the SEC explicitly warned that this list is neither exclusive nor exhaustive.
See id.
53. See id. at 10.
54. See id.
55. In support of its position, the SEC cited Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988), in which the Court held:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow . . . [b]ut ease of
application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of
the Securities Acts and Congress' policy decisions. Any
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as
materiality, must necessarily be over- or underinclusive.
Id. at 236.
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Second, Regulation FD requires simultaneous public disclosure
in cases of "intentional" disclosures.56 The SEC will consider a
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to be
intentional only when "the person making the disclosure either
knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she
is communicating is both material and nonpublic."5 7 By requiring
either knowledge or recklessness to establish an intentional
disclosure, the SEC hopes to reassure issuers that they will not be
second-guessed in difficult situations where the materiality of the
information is not readily apparent.58 The SEC has made it
abundantly clear that Regulation FD will not be enforced in any
cases where issuers or their personnel make mistaken materiality
determinations in the absence of recklessness.
59
Third, a violation of Regulation FD will not result in private
liability for the issuer.60 The SEC recognized the possibility that
creating private liability for an issuer's failure to make a material
nonpublic disclosure ultimately could have a chilling effect on
corporate communications.6 1 Accordingly, "private plaintiffs cannot
rely on an issuer's violation of Regulation FD as a basis for a private
action alleging Rule lOb-5 violations." 62 If an issuer fails to abide by
Regulation FD, it will be subject only to an SEC enforcement
action.63  In such a situation, the agency could bring either an
administrative action or a civil action against the issuer.64 In some
cases, it may even bring an enforcement action against the individual
responsible for the selective disclosure.65  Nevertheless, since the
SEC decided against creating private liability for Regulation FD, the
liability associated with a breach of the rule is relatively limited.
In sum, while Regulation FD may have complicated the lives of
some executives and analysts, the SEC has made every reasonable
effort to ensure that the rule itself is as uncomplicated as possible.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a)(1) (2001).
57. Id. § 243.101(a).
58. See Final Rule, supra note 2, at 6.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at l9.
62. Id. at 20.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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As with any new law, there will be some confusion regarding the
precise prescriptions of Regulation FD, but the uncertainty will
gradually fade with the passage of time. For the moment, Regulation
FD must be given the chance to fulfill its potential and bring fairness
and equality to the markets. The preliminary data indicates that it
has already made significant strides toward leveling the playing field
for the common investor. Although many critics preemptively
condemned Regulation FD as a failed experiment that was doomed
from the start, in reality, the measure has produced results that
perhaps even its most strident detractors may not be able to
disregard.
III. THE IMPACT OF REGULATION FD ON THE MARKETS
In 1999, Abercrombie & Fitch, a popular retailer, was accused
of privately informing an analyst that its third-quarter earnings were
going to fall short of expectations. 66 The company's stock lost forty
percent of its value over a span of five days before the bad news was
finally shared with the public.67 That same year, Hewlett-Packard
told a select group of analysts that it had experienced a problem with
component flow outside the United States. 8 It took approximately
one week for the company to disclose this information to the public,
but by that time its shares had already fallen a full twelve points.69
These corporations, as well as several others like Goldman Sachs,
Pepsi, and Compaq, recently found themselves the subjects of
intense media scrutiny as a result of the preferential treatment they
afforded particular members of the investment community.70
In all of these cases, the considerable injustice fostered by
corporate exclusionary practices was clearly demonstrated. While a
number of broker-dealers, their clients, and other well-connected
investors were able to liquidate their positions in these corporations
with time to spare, most individual investors were left holding on to
their shares as they searched in vain for the reason for such dramatic
price drops. When they were finally apprised of the negative
66. See Labate & Hill, supra note 9, at 22.
67. See id.
68. See Fred Barbash, Companies, Analysts a Little Too Cozy, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 1999, at Hi.
69. See id.
70. See Final Rule, supra note 2, at 4 n. 11.
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information several days later, there was little that they could do
beyond lamenting their losses. For some, it was too late to get out;
for others, it was simply too risky to stay in.71 In the view of the
SEC, the sheer sense of inequity that had pervaded the market had to
be eliminated before further damage could be done.72  With the
adoption of Regulation FD, the SEC believed that it had remedied
the situation. According to critics of the rule, however, the SEC only
succeeded in making matters worse.
The detractors of Regulation FD primarily contend that the
measure negatively affects the market by increasing volatility and
decreasing the quality and quantity of information disclosed to the
public.73 With respect to their first claim, the creation of a more
volatile market environment, the critics argue that the cessation of
selective disclosure practices directly undermines the stability of the
market.74 Previously, Corporation X would leak adverse information
to preferred analysts, who would then advise their clients and firms
accordingly, and Corporation X's stock price would gradually adjust
to the information as the news slowly trickled down to the remaining
shareholders and the public at large.75 Now, in contrast, Regulation
FD clearly obliges Corporation X to disclose the adverse information
to everyone at once, likely causing its shares to rapidly decline in
value as a flood of investors rush to close out their positions in the
company. In light of this change, the opponents of Regulation FD
claim that while "selective disclosure cannot prevent an issuer's
stock from declining, such disclosures can reduce the chance that
nervous investors will exaggerate the decline by selling shares."
76
71. For some investors-specifically those who bought stock on margin-it
may have been impossible to maintain their positions. Buying on margin
allows investors to borrow a portion of the money needed to buy stock from
the broker. If, however, the stock price plummets, as it did in these instances,
the investors could lose their initial investments and owe substantial sums to
their brokers. For these investors, therefore, the cost of selective disclosure
was particularly steep.
72. See Final Rule, supra note 2, at 2-3.
73. See Regulation FD Survey Reveals Strong Disdain by Analysts,
Por#folio Managers, supra note 9, http://www.pondel.com/pages/
regfdsurvey.html.
74. See Thomas G. Donlan, Editorial, Phony Fairness: Reg. FD Will Hurt
Markets and Investors, BARROWS, Oct. 23, 2000, at 78.
75. See Jennings, supra note 41, at 597.
76. Id.
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To avoid exaggerated price drops and to preserve stability in the
market, the critics assert that Regulation FD ought to be repealed. 7
Although the end of selective disclosure may mark the
beginning of a slightly higher level of volatility in the market, thi,
alone certainly would not justify the repeal of Regulation FD. Tc
begin with, any increased volatility spurred by the widespread
disclosure of information likely would be limited and relatively
inconsequential. In the wake of disappointing earnings, a
corporation's stock may suffer a sharp decline over the span of a day
or two in the absence of selective disclosure practices, but the critics
of Regulation FD have yet to argue that the stock would lose any
more value than it would if selective disclosure practices continued
to take place. In other words, the stance of the critics on this point is
only that Regulation FD causes the price drop to be more rapid, not
more severe.
So, since the decline would only take place over a shorter period
of time and would not be any more extensive, the issue becomes
whether Regulation FD is worth a somewhat greater degree of short-
term volatility. One would assume that almost any investor would
gladly trade a stable and unfair market for one that is volatile and
fair. The sudden release of negative information may send a horde
of panic-stricken shareholders to the doors, but at least Regulation
FD provides them with the chance and the choice to sell their shares
at a fair price. If the price decline takes place over two days as
opposed to one week, but all investors have an equal opportunity to
sell their shares, a somewhat more temporarily volatile market is a
natural-and also a necessary-consequence of creating a level
playing field.
It is important to further note that the critics of Regulation FD
often fail to mention that volatility is a two-way street. They never
seem to discuss the instances when companies have positive news to
report; they appear to focus their attention only on the instances
when companies possess adverse information. The reality is,
77. See Donlan, supra note 74, at 78; Bruce Machneier, Fair Disclosure or
Flawed Disclosure?, STAR TRIB., Oct. 23, 2000, at 3D; O'Keefe, supra note 9,
at 392; Joseph Weber, Editorial, Give 'Fair Disclosure' Time to Work, Bus.
WK., Jan. 8, 2001, at 42; Jay Somaney, Editorial, RegFD's Fallout: Increased
Volatility, Precipitous Stock Drops, THESTREET.COM (July 5, 2001), at
http://www.thestreet.com/_cnet/comment/overunder/1480998.html.
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however, that selective disclosure not only prevented most investors
from discarding sinking stocks at reasonable exit points, but it also
prevented most investors from buying soaring stocks at cheap entry
points. Executives commonly tipped off their favored analysts as to
both negative and positive news,78 so when the latter was divulged,
only well-connected investors were able to purchase rising stocks at
comparatively low prices. As usual, selective disclosure robbed the
common investor of the information necessary to make the often-
difficult decision of whether to invest hard-earned capital in a
particular corporation. Regulation FD finally gives individual
investors an equal opportunity to reap the benefits of sharp upward
price spikes that even the most vocal opponents of the rule would
normally welcome with open arms.
Therefore, even though the sudden public disclosure of negative
information may blindside investors and trigger immediate large-
scale sell-offs of disappointing stocks,79 Regulation FD at the very
least ensures that the common investor will be in the same position
as the well-connected investor should it become necessary to sell the
shares of a corporation that appears to be headed for a fall. Further,
the rule also affords the common investor the chance to get in on a
rising stock before it nears or reaches its peak. If a slight increase in
volatility is the price that must be paid to restore fairness and equity
to the markets, then so be it. After all, "[t]he purpose of the
regulation was to remedy unfairness, not to smooth out market
fluctuations, protect investors from themselves or make life easier for
analysts. 80  If the critics of Regulation FD value a less volatile
market over a fair market, they clearly have lost sight of-or simply
cannot appreciate-the SEC's primary objective in eliminating
selective disclosure practices.
Aside from claiming that Regulation FD is the direct cause of a
higher degree of volatility in the market, the detractors of the rule
also maintain that it has had a "chilling effect" on corporate
disclosure, "resulting in information of reduced quantity and
quality."'' In support of their assertion, the critics often point to
78. See Don't Roll Back Fair Disclosure, supra note 7, at 124.
79. See Weber, supra note 77, at 42.
80. Barbash, supra note 10, at Hi.
81. Norm Alster, Tight Lips Sink Stock Tips: Has Regulation FD Had a
Chilling Effect on the Flow of Information from Public Companies?,
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various surveys that have been conducted that seem to corroborate
82the existence of a "chilled" market environment. For example,
approximately five months after the adoption of Regulation FD,
NIRI conducted a survey of 577 companies and determined that
twenty-four percent were providing less information since the
passage of the rule.83  Similarly, the Association for Investment
Management and Research (AIMR) reported that fifty-seven percent
of over 6,000 analysts and portfolio managers surveyed indicated
that the volume of substantive information disclosed had decreased
after Regulation FD took effect. 84 While these figures may seem
somewhat distressing at first glance, their importance is substantially
mitigated upon further investigation.
First, although NIRI found that twenty-four percent of
companies surveyed were disclosing less since the adoption of
Regulation FD, it also discovered that forty-eight percent had been
issuing about the same amount and twenty-eight percent had actually
been disclosing more information to the public following the passage
of the rule.85  Second, NIRI also reported that while only sixty
percent of the companies surveyed allowed full public access to
conference calls prior to Regulation FD, eighty-nine percent were
doing so less than six months later. 86 Third, NIRI's findings have
been supported by a similar survey of 164 corporations by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, in which fifty-one percent said that
Regulation FD has had no impact on the frequency of disclosure, and
of the forty-seven percent that saw an impact, forty-eight percent
said they were disclosing more frequently.87 With respect to
Regulation FD's effect on the quantity of information disclosed, the
survey revealed that fifty-four percent saw an impact, and of that
ELECTRONIC Bus., July 1, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
82. See Analysts, Portfolio Managers Say Volume, Quality of Information
Have Fallen, SEC. WK., Apr. 9, 2001, at 9; NIRI Finds Some Members 'Clam
Up' with Reg FD, O'DWYER'S PR SERVICES REP., Apr. 2001, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News File.
83. See NIRI Finds Some Members 'Clam Up'with Reg FD, supra note 82,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
84. See Analysts, Port'olio Managers Say Volume, Quality of Information
Have Fallen, supra note 82, at 9.
85. See NIRI Finds Some Members 'Clam Up' with Reg FD, supra note 82,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
86. See id.
87. See Barbash, supra note 10, at H1.
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group, fifty-seven percent revealed that they were disclosing more
since the SEC's adoption of the rule.8 8 Finally, First Call/Thompson
Financial has also reported a positive impact, as it found that the
number of companies that provided preannouncements of positive or
negative news prior to releasing their regular quarterly results rose a
remarkable eighty percent over the closing quarter of 1999.89 Hence,
it would be more than reasonable to conclude, based on these figures,
that Regulation FD has not led to a disturbing chill of corporate
disclosures. Clearly, the overwhelming majority of the data confirms
that "the doom-and-gloom scenario that some had predicted is not
happening.
' 90
This conclusion may be based on information that was gathered
mostly through informal questionnaires, but it has also been echoed
by the first large-scale, formal empirical analysis of the effects of
Regulation FD on the quality of information in the capital markets.
91
A joint study by the University of Southern California and Purdue
University has failed to uncover any evidence to support the dire
predictions made by the critics of Regulation FD since the adoption
of the rule.92 The study revealed:
If poorer information were available to investors since
Regulation FD, stock prices would converge more slowly
toward their post-announcement levels. However, since
implementation of Regulation FD, the typical (median)
firm's stock price converges faster towards its post-
announcement level, suggesting that the market is not
receiving lower-quality information about the upcoming
earnings.
93
Therefore, the USC-Purdue study found that Regulation FD has not
damaged the market's information environment. In fact, the study
found that the only major change the SEC's latest measure has been
responsible for is almost doubling the number of voluntary earnings
88. See id.
89. See Weber, supra note 77, at 42.
90. Barbash, supra note 10, at HI.
91. See Chordas, supra note 10, at http://www.ccbn.com/regulationfd/
20010723.html.
92. See id.
93. Id.
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disclosures by companies. 94 Overall, then, the study concluded that
there actually had been "no deterioration, and perhaps even some
improvement, in the financial information environment prior to
earnings announcements." 95 This is hardly consistent with the harsh
criticism from the detractors of Regulation FD, who appear prepared
to hold their ground despite the fact that the available data seems to
completely contradict their stance.
To put it mildly, Regulation FD may be unpopular among
certain sectors of the investment community, 96 but the SEC probably
never meant to gain admirers when it adopted the controversial rule.
Regulation FD was intended to remedy a glaring flaw in the market,
a harmful inequity that could no longer be permitted to persist. The
opponents of the measure likely would have little difficulty agreeing
with its proponents that Regulation FD has clearly succeeded in
restoring fairness to the market. However, the former sharply depart
from the latter by taking the position that the volatility and
information chill supposedly caused by the elimination of selective
disclosure warrant the repeal of Regulation FD and a return to a two-
tiered market.
Such a stance, though, is simply untenable. First, a minor
increase in short-term volatility is a small price to pay for equality in
the market. Second, a formal study and a number of surveys have
determined that the quality and quantity of corporate disclosures
have in fact improved since Regulation FD took effect. While some
companies may be disclosing less for fear of liability, they will likely
begin to disclose more once they realize that the SEC does not intend
to enforce Regulation FD in close cases. 97 The chairman of the SEC,
Harvey Pitt, has reassured companies that the agency will not try "to
second-guess reasonable, good faith judgments by persons who
honestly attempt to comply with Regulation FD."9' Thus, in time, it
should become quite evident that Regulation FD aims to create a
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See Alison Beard, New Disclosure Rules Come Under Attack, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 18, 2001, at 28; Joshua Chaffin, Goldman Speaks Out
on RegFD, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 2001, at 15.
97. See Pitt Concurs in Staff Views on 'Good Faith' Reg FD Compliance,
BNA.coM (Aug. 20, 2001), at http://corplawcenter.bna.com/corplawcenter/
1,1103,2_919,00.html.
98. Id.
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level playing field in the market not to set a trap for executives
attempting to abide by the rule.99 For now, though, it should be
apparent that the value of Regulation FD to the market and to the
individual investor ought to outweigh the seemingly unjustified
assaults by the rule's detractors.
IV. THE IMPACT OF REGULATION FD ON ANALYSTS
Without a doubt, those who stand to lose the most from the
passage of Regulation FD are the securities analysts who are no
longer able to obtain advance notice of material developments from
the companies that they cover. It should come as little surprise, then,
that a senior partner at a Boston law firm stated: "The only people I
know who still purport to be discomforted [by the measure] are
securities analysts."' 00 In truth, the hostility felt toward Regulation
FD by many analysts is understandable. After all, the rule has taken
away their most direct and accessible source of advance material
information-the companies themselves. For the first time ever,
analysts have been compelled to rely entirely on effort and skill, not
inside information.
Consequently, it has been stated that Regulation FD "has made
most analysts stock-guessers rather than [stock-]pickers because they
do not receive that wink and nod from company management."' 1 1 It
is perhaps this line of thinking that has prompted some to predict that
Regulation FD will either lead to a lesser role for analysts (since
corporate disclosures are now available to everyone at once) 102 or a
large-scale "shakeout" that will claim the jobs of analysts who
simply cannot perform a proper analysis without the aid of selective
disclosure.
0 3
The latter would appear to be the more probable scenario.
Securities analysts will always be needed to make sense of data that
the vast majority of investors are not qualified to evaluate. The fact
99. See id.
100. Steven Syre & Charles Stein, Boston Capital: After One Year, All's
Fair in Disclosure, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2001, at Fl.
101. Somaney, supra note 77, at http://www.thestreet.com/-cnet/commentl
overunder/1480998.html.
102. See Final Rule, supra note 2, at 4.
103. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Tackling New Regulation FD, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
18, 2000, atB6.
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that the public will have equal access to material information will not
change the reality that many investors still will have a genuine need
for analysts to interpret that information for them. On the other
hand, analysts who are entirely dependent upon well-placed
connections for their so-called "analyses" and are unable to conduct
a proper assessment of information on their own, will be expendable
because investors now have access to the identical information-at
no cost-through the companies directly. Regulation FD, therefore,
will almost certainly lead to a fatal "'differentiation between analysts
who regurgitate information from companies and those who"'
actually conduct a proper analysis.
10 4
Ironically enough, by bringing about this much-needed
differentiation, the SEC may have indirectly improved upon the
performance of securities analysts. According to a survey, twenty-
eight percent of analysts said that, since Regulation FD, "they were
conducting more of their own original research, such as digging
through public documents and probing customers and competitors of
the companies they cover .... 1,,05 As one analyst has stated: "'I
find it somewhat frustrating with some companies, but to be honest
that's what we're supposed to do-find that information from
outside the company ... .,,,106 Somewhat surprisingly, the result of
cutting off analysts from inside information over the past year has
been a remarkable increase of thirty percent in analyst accuracy in
regard to predicting earnings. 0 7 Hence, in the process of leveling
the playing field for the common investor, the SEC may have
stumbled upon a way to improve both the effort and the accuracy of
securities analysts.1
0 8
Furthermore, by eliminating selective disclosure, it seems as
though the SEC may have also unintentionally leveled the playing
104. Labate & Hill, supra note 9, at 22.
105. Labate, supra note 5, at 8.
106. Jason Chow, Analysts' Calls Better Under FD: Warnings Lift News
Flow, NAT'L POST, Oct. 24, 2001, at INI.
107. See id.
108. In fact, a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 101 chief financial
officers and managing directors found that "executives believe the 'best'
analysts are spending more time on fundamental research since the advent of
Regulation FD ... ." Top Executives Say "Best" Analysts Focus More on
Fundamentals than Forecasts, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, Aug. 14, 2001, at
http://www.barometersurveys.com/pr/mg010814.html.
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field for analysts, not just investors. Prior to Regulation FD, the
primary recipients of selective disclosure were analysts from the
largest and most powerful brokerage firms in the nation.10 9 As a
result, somewhat less notable analysts and firms were actually in no
better shape than the common investor when selective disclosure
played such a prominent role in the investment community. No
matter how much research they did, the accuracy of their analyses
could never come close to matching that of the beneficiaries of
selective disclosure. Since the passage of Regulation FD, however,
the situation has dramatically changed. In today's market, the
absence of selective disclosure means that an independent money
manager from Kansas City is no worse off than even the most
influential securities analyst on Wall Street. "0 The information that
was once reserved only for select analysts from powerful firms is
now available to anyone who wants or needs it. Thus, Regulation
FD has not only put an end to the long-standing disparity that
separated investors, but it has also cured the underemphasized
inequality that existed among securities analysts themselves.
It is rather evident, then, that Regulation FD has changed the
rules of the game for everyone, investors and analysts alike. With
respect to the latter, there seems to be little dispute that the analysts
who cannot play by the new rules likely will not be playing for much
longer. The analysts who adapt, in contrast, will be performing their
duties properly, without the guidance of a corporate insider. Further,
if the past year is any indication of the future, the reformed analysts
may find that independent research will lead to better results in
conducting their analyses. As previously noted, in the short time
since the adoption of Regulation FD, analysts' forecasts have
become remarkably more accurate. If this positive trend continues,
post-Regulation FD analysts may actually become far more
important to the investment community than ever before.
V. CONCLUSION
On any given day prior to October 23, 2000, by the mere act of
buying or selling shares of a publicly traded corporation in the
109. See John Labate, Learning to Live with a Largely Lambasted Law, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2001, at 26.
110. See id.
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United States, the common investor may have become the
unknowing victim of a terrible injustice, one that had been
deliberately implemented and perpetuated by Wall Street itself. For,
as it turns out, the average investor had been contributing hard-
earned capital to a market that had not provided a level playing field
to all of its participants until just over one year ago. The investor
was investing in a corrupt market that permitted corporations to
legally disclose material information to a group of favored financial
analysts without so much as saying a word to its shareholders or the
public. It was only with the adoption of the wildly controversial
Regulation FD on October 23, 2000, that the SEC finally prohibited
the odious practice--or, to some, the sacred ritual--of selective
disclosure.
The difference of opinion that existed between the proponents
and opponents of Regulation FD was plainly evident well before the
passage of the rule. To this day, a massive rift remains between the
two sides. While the supporters of Regulation FD contend that the
restoration of fairness and equity to the market justifies any volatility
or information chill that may result, the detractors of the rule strongly
insist that the market will not be able to function properly until the
measure is repealed. Although principles of fairness have prevailed
up until this point, there is still cause for concern that ignoble
interests could undermine the SEC's efforts to finally bring parity to
the market.
Though the critics of Regulation FD are careful not to draw any
attention to them, there are a number of problems associated with the
rule that must be worked out. For one, the SEC created a "media
carve-out" in the measure that permits the overt disclosure of
material nonpublic information to members of the media based on
the view that they will disseminate, and not trade upon, the disclosed
information." This exception poses a clear threat to the integrity of
the rule because "if a company official.., disclosed material,
nonpublic information to a reporter, who in turn called an analyst for
comment on that information before the story was published or aired,
111. See Clarification of the "Media Carve-Out" Under Regulation FD,
NIRI EXECUTIVE ALERT (May 17, 2001), at http://www.niri.org/publications/
alerts/ea051701 .cfm.
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that official would not be in violation of Regulation FD." 112 The
potential for abuse is troubling and readily apparent.
Another serious issue that must be addressed concerns the
allegations that, while there has been a dramatic rise in the number of
public access audio conferences since the adoption of Regulation FD,
some companies have found a new way to restrict their
disclosures.1 13  Evidently, "[w]hat some companies have done is
selectively decide who will ask the questions. Conference calls have
become stacked with favored analysts."' "14 If this practice is taking
place, it clearly violates the spirit of Regulation FD by essentially
reviving the inappropriate relationship that the SEC aimed to abolish
by eliminating selective disclosure. It limits corporate disclosures in
a manner that negatively affects the public because "the most
penetrating questions often come from the least likely sources."
1 15
Unless the SEC puts an end to these types of technical violations, the
ability of Regulation FD to level the playing field in the market will
be significantly hampered.
Finally, perhaps the most disturbing problem of all is the refusal
of certain companies to abide by the standards set forth in Regulation
FD. The SEC has been investigating the possible violation of the
rule by at least half a dozen companies already, including the likes of
Raytheon, the third-biggest U.S. defense contractor, and Motorola,
the second-largest mobile phone maker.116 In fact, it may even be
preparing to bring its first enforcement action in the coming
months." 7  As previously stated, companies will soon learn that
Regulation FD is primarily meant to change behavior, not to punish
it. Nonetheless, companies that persist in refusing to adhere to the
prescriptions of the rule will soon find out that if they do not change
their behavior, they will be punished.
Naturally, the above assumes that Regulation FD will overcome
the considerable efforts that have been made, and will almost
certainly continue to be made, to arrest the restoration of fairness to
112. Id. (emphasis omitted).
113. See Alster, supra note 81, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See SEC to Review Fair Disclosure Case, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 2001, at
C4.
117. See id.
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the market. The key to the survival of the SEC's controversial rule
likely will rest in the hands of the agency's newest chairman, Harvey
Pitt. Due to his criticism of the rule prior to his nomination as
chairman, Pitt has been expected by many to find a way to render
Regulation FD toothless or to repeal the measure altogether.
However, since taking office, he has done nothing to suggest that he
will strip the market of the equality that is essential to its well-being.
In fact, it has been said that .'[w]hether in the public or private
sector, Harvey Pitt has represented his client admirably ... ,,,118
Thus, as long as Pitt keeps in mind that the small investor is currently
the client who is most in need of his protection, the detractors of
Regulation FD will have no choice but to get accustomed to a market
free from selective disclosure practices.
In sum, Regulation FD may not be perfect, but laws rarely are.
By ridding the market of selective disclosure, the SEC may have
slightly increased volatility and led some companies to temporarily
disclose less information to investors. Yet, in doing so, the SEC
made an essential covenant with the common investor, that all
participants in the market thereafter would be equal. This pledge
more than makes up for any increased volatility or information chill.
To paraphrase Arthur Levitt, it is a promise that truly makes markets
possible. It is a promise that must be kept.
John Tishbi*
118. Charles Zehren, Independent Pitt Just What SEC Needs?, NEWSDAY,
July 11, 2001, atA36.
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Loyola Law School; M.A., 2000, University of
Toronto; B.A., 1999, University of Toronto. This Comment is dedicated to my
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APPENDIX
17 C.F.R. § 243.100
§ 243.100 General rule regarding selective disclosure.
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses
any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its
securities to any person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section,
the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information as
provided in § 243.10 1(e):
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section,
paragraph (a) of this section shall apply to a disclosure made to any
person outside the issuer:
(i) Who is a broker or dealer, or a person associated with a broker or
dealer, as those terms are defined in Section 3(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a));
(ii) Who is an investment adviser, as that term is defined in Section
202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-
2(a)(1 1)); an institutional investment manager, as that term is defined
in Section 13(f)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78m(f)(5)), that filed a report on Form 13F (17 CFR 249.325)
with the Commission for the most recent quarter ended prior to the
date of the disclosure; or a person associated with either of the
foregoing. For purposes of this paragraph, a "person associated with
an investment adviser or institutional investment manager" has the
meaning set forth in Section 202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(17)), assuming for these purposes
that an institutional investment manager is an investment adviser;
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(iii) Who is an investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), or who would
be an investment company but for Section 3(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. 80a-
3(c)(1)) or Section 3(c)(7) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7)) thereof, or an
affiliated person of either of the foregoing. For purposes of this
paragraph, "affiliated person" means only those persons described in
Section 2(a)(3)(C), (D), (E), and (F) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(3)(C), (D), (E), and (F)), assuming for
these purposes that a person who would be an investment company
but for Section 3(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(I)) or Section 3(c)(7) (15
U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7)) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 is an
investment company; or
(iv) Who is a holder of the issuer's securities, under circumstances in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will purchase or
sell the issuer's securities on the basis of the information.
(2) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a disclosure made:
(i) To a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer
(such as an attorney, investment banker, or accountant);
(ii) To a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed
information in confidence;
(iii) To an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit
ratings, provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose
of developing a credit rating and the entity's ratings are publicly
available; or
(iv) In connection with a securities offering registered under the
Securities Act, other than an offering of the type described in any of
Rule 415(a)(1)(i)-(vi) (§ 230.415(a)(1)(i)-(vi) of this chapter).
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